Many central banks intervene to influence exchange rates in floating exchange rate regimes. That’s called dirty floating.
Many developing and emerging markets peg to the dollar.


























Countries would exploit flexible rates in order to gain competitive advantage.
President Trump has complained about Europe and other countries devaluing their currencies, and push for offsetting tarriffs.
The argument that Johnson made was that if countries had limited reserves, in the face of trade deficits they would be inclined to use protective measures in order to improve their positions.
As economists we don’t necessarily believe in that direct link between tariffs and the current account.
Economists usually focus on limited reserves, but how about perhaps even more importantly the issue of competitivevess (that is, even if you have )
Capital mobility under Bretton Woods was driven.
1960s: measures that expanded the scope for long term capital movements.
1925: Return to Gold
Exchange Rate Flexibility is the worst currency systems except all others that have been tried.



Limiting international payments.
In a modern world of high capital mobility.
Volume of international financial transaction is greater than that of trade transactions.








As I told you, I do not believe in sticky prices very much.
Or at least, not in the way that New-Keynesians believe in sticky prices.
Rather, I believe that Keynesian effects come from an excess of savings over investment, and that’s my measure of slack.

More effects on the trade balance in fixed exchange rate regimes than in floating rate regimes.
Why do we think that is ?
One explanation could be that a devaluation due to an easing of monetary policy prior to stimulus acts like a “tarriff” prior to stimulation. Hence, goods from abroad are more expensive for local consumers.
Another could be that investors are less worried about exchange rate risk with fixed rates.


I see this as another confirmation that the Phillips curve is valid only under fixed exchange rates.
Indeed, both positive supply shocks on the Traded Goods sector, as well as positive demand shocks in the non-traded goods sector leads to an appreciation in the real exchange rates, as well as diminished unemployment in a place.
At the same time, positive


Prior to the collapse, the Mexican peso had been operating a fixed parity against the $US. However, leading up to the end of 1994, there were several underlying weaknesses in the Mexican economy which led speculators to question the sustainability of the peg. Including: (1) PPP calculations which indicated that prices/costs had risen in excess of trading partners, implying that the fixed exchange rate was overvalued. This was indicated as the cause of a growing current account deficit, which rose to 7% of GDP in 1993 and 8% in 1994.











Eichengreen, Barry. 1992. Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. Oxford University Press.
Mundell, Robert A. 1961a. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” The American Economic Review 51 (4): 657–65. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1812792.
———. 1961b. “Flexible Exchange Rates and Employment Policy.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique 27 (4): 509–17. https://doi.org/10.2307/139437.
———. 1963. “Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d’Economique et de Science Politique 29 (4): 475–85. https://doi.org/10.2307/139336.